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MYRES S. MCDOUGAL DISTINGUISHED LECTURE 2016
MASS MIGRATION, CULTURAL CONFLICT, AND THE FEAR OF
TERRORISM:
DILEMMAS OF THE DEMOCRATIC WEST
*PRESENTED BY PROFESSOR TOM FARER AT THE UNIVERSITY OF DENVER COLLEGE
OF LAW ON THE OCCASION OF THE ANNUAL SUTTON COLLOQUIUM
I. INTRODUCTION: THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF MASS MIGRATION
There is no reason to believe that 2015 was the high-water mark of migration,
documented and undocumented, from the lands of mass poverty to the wealthy and
comparatively well-ordered countries of the West. In the next thirty-five years, tens
of millions more people are likely to begin the trek to the West driven by the
economic, social and political pathologies of the lands of their birth and pulled by
visions of affluence and security. Some will seek entry invoking the right to be
protected from persecution.I Others implicitly will invoke a moral right to build a
better life for themselves and their families.2 The world's population is headed
* Professor Tom Farer is the former dean of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies (1996-2010)
and currently a University Professor at the University of Denver. He served as a member of the Inter-
American Human Rights Commission of the OAS from 1976-83 (President from 1980-82) and also as
President of the University of New Mexico in the mid- 1980s. He is a member of the editorial board of
the Human Rights Quarterly and the American Journal of International Law.
1. U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Introductory Note to Convention and
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 3 (2010), http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aal0.pdf (An
"Asylum seeker" is a person who has arrived at the border of a state or gained entry by whatever means
and has applied for asylum under the 1951 Refugee Convention on the ground that he or she has a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, political belief or membership in a
social group if they return to their country of origin. Technically a refugee is a person whose application
for asylum has been successful, but in lay discourse the term is often applied to anyone who appears to
have fled their country of origin either because of the stipulated fear of persecution or to avoid being
caught in the cross fire of an armed conflict. The term is often applied as well to persons uprooted by a
natural disaster which has put their lives at risk. Some national courts have stretched the concept still
wider to embrace individuals fleeing fearsomely abusive spouses or families. Once a person has come
within the jurisdiction of a state, the principle of "non-refoulment" precludes a state from expelling the
person to a country, whether or not the country of origin, where he or she is at risk of torture or execution.
While this principle is embodied in the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, it has evolved
into a principle of customary law and so is binding on all countries.).
2. Compare CHRISTOPHER HEATH WELLMAN & PHILLIP COLE, DEBATING THE ETHICS OF
IMMIGRATION: Is THERE A RIGHT To EXCLUDE? 8-9 (Sept. 30, 2011). (The author's justification for
debating the ethics of immigration largely in terms of theory rather than more instrumental considerations
like economic impact: "It is the role of theory... to challenge 'common sense,'. And we can at least shift
it out of the consciousness of those who engage in this debate at the theoretical level.... Theory is the use
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toward 11 billion or more by the end of the century3 in the absence of nuclear war
or collision with a large asteroid or the discovery by nihilists of how to combine the
lethality of Ebola with the contagiousness of the common cold. Less than twenty
years ago, the conventional wisdom among demographers was that the world's
population would peak in 2050 at 9 billion.4 Now, according to United Nations (UN)
reports, it is expected to hit almost 10 billion by mid-century and surpass 11 billion
by 2100.'
The largest bulk of that growth will occur in Africa. Experts estimate that a
population that has already grown 50 percent in the last fifteen years will by 2050
double from the present 1.25 billion to approximately 2.5 billion and continue to
surge toward 4 billion by the century's end.' To convey a sense of what that means
for individual countries, Nigeria's population alone is projected to leap from today's
roughly 180 million to 500 million by mid-century7 and the population in the risibly
mirsnamed Democratic Republic of the Congo should expand from the current 75
million (an increase of 55 million since 1970) to 194 million.8 Meanwhile, most of
the rich countries will shrink absent large-scale immigration. Japan, to take an
extreme case, with its 1.1 birthrate is projected to diminish from 120 million to less
than 100 million by the middle of the century.9 Italy, Spain, and Germany tag closely
behind. "
In Asia, Pakistan's increasingly violent and dysfunctional society will likely
add 50 million people just in the next fifteen years. Swelling numbers are also
predicted for Afghanistan, from today's roughly 25 million to 55 million in 2050."
Demographic pressure in the Middle East and North Africa present a
of the imagination to construct possibilities, and we can only critically examine our beliefs if we are
prepared to imagine other possibilities."), with CHANDRAN KUKATHAS, THE LIBERAL ARCHIPELAGO: A
THEORY OF DIVERSITY AND FREEDOM (2003) (After conceding that a campaign for open borders is
politically untenable, he goes on to encourage theorizing about and coming to recognize the case for it.).
3. U.N. Dep't. of Social and Economic Affairs, World Population Projected to Reach 9.7 billion
by 2050 (Jul. 29, 2015), http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/news/population/2015-report.html (last
visited Apr. 23, 2017); see also Rod Nordland, A Migration Crisis, andIt May Yet Get Worse, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/I1/01/world/europe/a-mass-migration-crisis-and-it-
may-yet-get-worse.html?_r-0 (last visited Apr. 23, 2017).
4. U.N. Dep't. of Social and Economic Affairs Population Div., The World at Six Billion,
Introduction U.N. Doc. ESA/P/WP.154 (Oct. 12, 1999),
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/sixbillion/sixbilpartl.pdf.
5. U.N. Dep't. of Social and Economic Affairs, supra note 3.
6. Ivana Kottasova, Biggest populations in 2050: Move over Russia and Mexico. Here comes





10. Fertility Statistics, Eurostat (Dec. 22, 2016), http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/pdfscache/1 273.pdf.
I1. U.N. Dep't of Econ. and Soc. Affairs, Population Div., World Population Prospects: The 2015
Revision, Key Findings and Advance Tables, ESA/P/WP.241 18 (2015),
https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Publications/Files/KeyFindings WPP 2015.pdf
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particularly daunting picture for European political leaders concerned about
managing immigration. In the second half of the twentieth Century, the population
of the Middle East and North Africa increased fourfold, from about 93 to 347 million
people.12 Furthermore, that number is projected to double in the next thirty-five
years, becoming roughly 680 million tightly packed persons by 2050.13
Powerful push factors beyond sheer numbers are at work in parts of the Global
South. Anarchic violence, civil war, and persecution have already driven more than
60 million people from their traditional homes.14 Some are displaced within national
territories; others have fled across borders.'5
Potentially dwarfing the numbers fleeing violence and persecution are the tens
of millions of young people arriving at the door of the labor markets of developing
countries, which seem incapable of bringing them into stable employment much less
opportunities to prosper. In the Middle East and North Africa, 60 percent of the
population is now under the age of twenty-five.16 Less than 50 percent of people
aged sixteen to thirty have regular employment and prospects for improvement in
that figure are dim." For many young job searchers, formal educatioihal
qualifications appear irrelevant: According to the World Bank, 30 percent of the
unemployed in the Middle East and North Africa are university graduates, the
victims of low quality education and a lack of relevant job skills, as well as
insufficient private sector capital investment and persistent misgovernment.8
Conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa, where many governments are hardly more than
vertically integrated criminal conspiracies for the extraction of wealth from tortured
societies, are just as grim or grimmer.19
The swelling migrant tide has fueled a political reaction which is proving much
more toxic in Europe than in the United States. In this country, a coalition of liberals,
big business, agricultural interests and members of earlier diaspora battle on the
whole effectively in favor of continuing immigration on a scale calculated to bring
the US population of almost 500 million by the middle of the century.2 o The issue of
migration is more toxic in European politics in part because it has become entangled




14. Sam Jones, One in every 113 people forced to flee, says UN refugee agency, THE GUARDIAN
(June 20, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/20 16/jun/20/one-in-every-113-
people-uprooted-war-persecution-says-un-refugee-agency.
15. Id.
16. Middle East and North Africa: Youth Facts, YOUTH POLICY,
http://www.youthpolicy.org/mappings/regionalyouthscenes/mena/facts/ (la t visited Feb. 28 2017).
17. Lili Mottaghi, The Problem of Unemployment in the Middle East and North Africa Explained
in Three Charts, THE WORLD BANK (Aug. 25, 2015), http://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/problem-
unemployment-middle-east-and-north-africa-explained-three-charts.
18. Id.
19. See generally SARAH CHAYES, THIEVES OF STATE: WHY CORRUPTION THREATENS GLOBAL
SECURITY (2015).
20. UN Dep't. of Social and Economic Affairs, supra note 3.
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in the politics of cultural conflict, inequality and economic stagnation.
II. MIGRATION AND CULTURAL CONFLICT
Cultural conflict in the United States is conducted largely among the long-
settled inhabitants, most sharply between devout evangelicals and conservative
Catholics, on the one hand, and social liberals and libertarians, on the other, between
addicts of Fox News and consumers of the New York Times. Although
traditionalists have not disappeared from West European countries,2' for the past
several decades social liberals have occupied the commanding heights of politics
and culture. Nominally the faith of the great majority of West Europeans, Christian
piety is more a background to contemporary society than an active presence. It does
not aggressively combat the sunny hedonism of day-to-day life among the middle
classes. To paraphrase Ronald Dworkin, Western Europe is a secular space where
religion is more wallpaper than immediate presence.22 The US is a religious country
in which religious indifference is tolerated.23
Since World War II, a steady stream of Muslim immigrants has entered
Continental Europe from Turkey, North, and to a lesser degree, West Africa. In the
United Kingdom, the stream's headwaters are primarily in South Asia. Despite a
very long history of Moslem-Christian conflict, the first wave of migrants from
predominantly Muslim countries did not generate anxiety, in part because the
migrants were needed to fill gaps in the labor force opened by the Post World War
II economic boom, and in part because particularly in the continental countries
governments assumed that the migrants were in essence guest workers who would
return to their countries of origin when they were no longer needed.2 4 This
expectation proved false. Most migrants stayed, their families joined them, and, as
usually occurs, the existence of diaspora communities encouraged and facilitated
new waves of migration even after the post-war European economies lost their
exuberance. Meanwhile, opportunities for the less skilled members of the indigenous
population and a fortiori for the second and third generations of immigrant families
have been eroding in the face of the economic transformations and disruptions
resulting from globalization and technological change.
Three other developments have turned the growing presence of migrants, but
particularly migrants who identify as Muslim, into a ferocious political issue. One is
simply numbers: A growing Muslim presence has become increasingly manifest at
the grassroots level of society as Muslims have sought space for public worship and
burial according to Muslim traditions and legal authority to slaughter animals in
accordance with Halal law.25 A second development has been the perceptible
21. Adam Nossiter, Frangois Fillon Wins Center-Right Nomination for French Presidency, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/27/world/europe/francois-fillon-wins-center-
right-nomination-for-french-presidency.html.
22. See generally Ronald Dworkin, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD (2013).
23. Id.
24. Muslim Migration to Europe, UNIVERsITY OF MINNESOTA (July 17, 2015),
https://cla.umn.edulihrc/news-events/other/muslim-migration-europe.
25. James Meikle, What exactly does the halal methods of animal slaughter involve?, THE
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alienation of many of the children and grandchildren of the first immigrant wave and
their disproportionate presence in the prison population. The recent phenomenon of
a limited number of young men and women, not all from poor families,26 departing
Europe to join ISIS has sharpened the perception of alienation.
Developments within the Muslim World have been a third factor generating
Islamophobia in European politics. An aggressive, intolerant piety, hostile to the
liberal norms which in Europe have displaced those of Christian traditionalism, has
gained increasing traction among Muslim populations worldwide, but particularly
in the Arab-speaking sub-world. Its affective power there is in part the result of the
political and military failure of Arab nationalism, a secular ideology of integration
and modernization which briefly captured the imagination of educated Arabs in the
decades before and just after the Second World War. The deflation of Arab
nationalism left a vacuum into which a species of Islamic thought analogous to
Christian fundamentalism rushed in. But it has also gained powerful traction in non-
Arab countries like Pakistan.27
Funded principally by Saudi oil wealth,28 the spread of fundamentalist heology
within Islam coincided with the demographic explosion I have already mentioned.29
It coincided as well with a vast movement of people from the countryside into the
region's cities3o bringing with them patriarchal traditions to which fundamentalist
Islam gave a theological legitimacy which could be wielded against the
condescension of sophisticated urban elites.
The spread of fundamentalist piety also coincided, of course, with armed
militancy spurred initially by the successful call for jihad against the Soviet
occupiers of Afghanistan and then reinforced by the difficulties Arab and West
Asian Governments have had in coping with the twin stresses of mushrooming
population growth and rocketing urbanization. Also fueling militancy, has been the
increasing militarized presence of the West in the Middle East and West Asia and
its association with repressive governments unable to help their swollen populations
enter the precincts of that lavish consumerism which the popular majority witness
in the media and in the lives of a small upper class. It is not, therefore, surprising
that the call for jihad against the "far enemy", as Osama Bin Laden described the
GUARDIAN (May 8, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2014/may/08/what-does-halal-
method-animal-slaughter-involve.
26. Heather Long, Who's joining ISIS? It might surprise you..., CNN MONEY (Dec. 15, 2015),
http://money.cnn.com/2015/12/15/news/economy/isis-recruit-characteristics/.
27. Directorate-General for External Policies, The Involvement of Salafism/Wahhabism in the
Support and Supply of Arms to Rebel Groups Around the World, at 5, AFET (June 2013),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegDataletudes/etudes/join/2013/457137/EXPO-
AFETET(2013)457137_EN.pdf.
28. Id. at 19; see also John Kemp, Saudi Arabia's oil reserves: how big are they really?, REUTERS
(July 11, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-oil-kemp-idUSKCNOZLIX6.
29. Muslim Migration to Europe, supra note 24.
30. Martin Hvidt, Economic diversification in GCC countries: Past record and future trends,
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West, found a sufficient number of receptive ears to bring mass casualty terrorism
into the cities of Europe as well as the United States.
These developments have produced in European electorates a mental
association of migration and militant anti-liberalism, an image fueling,
paradoxically, the rise of right-wing nationalist parties, illiberal themselves, and
driving the leaders of main-stream parties to repudiate what they call multi-
culturalism. 3 ' That repudiation implies either a cultural test for prospective migrants
or government-driven efforts at cultural assimilation of multi-generational migrant
families or both.
Obviously, the association of Islam with anti-liberalism in Europe finds an echo
in the United States, principally albeit not exclusively on the political right, even
though the Muslim community in the United States is small,32 for the most part
prosperous,'3 and with few exceptions integrated, by any definition of the word, into
economy and society.34
What makes European political developments exquisitely important to anyone
anywhere committed, however casually, to the defense of human rights is the issues
they raise first about the appropriate limits of liberal tolerance and majority power
and, conversely, the rights of religious and ethnic minorities. Those are the issues I
want to address all too briefly in this lecture and then discuss with you in the time
your patience and Ved's authority will allow.
Before going any further, however, I need to define exactly what I mean by the
words "Liberalism" and "fundamentalism" or "Traditionalism." First, "Liberalism."
I use the term not narrowly as a reference to some fraction of the American electorate
but rather in its larger philosophical meaning as a political and social order dedicated
to enabling individuals to shape continuously a personal identity and life plan in
light of their understanding of the meaning and value and possibilities of human
existence, in other words a political and social order in which human beings are the
architects of themselves. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights35 and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights3 6 are legal expressions of my
conception of Liberalism.
A corollary of respect for human agency is toleration of different choices
31. Clifford D. May, The Trouble with Multiculturalism, NAT'L REVIEW (June 21, 2012),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/303529/trouble-multiculturalism-clifford-d-may.
32. Besheer Mohamen, A new estimate of the U.S. Muslim population, PEW RESEARCH CENTER
(Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/01/06/a-new-estimate-of-the-u-s-muslim-
population/.




35. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25, G.A. Res. 217 (I) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(ll) (Dec. 10, 1948),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/U DHR/Documents/UDHRTranslations/eng.pdf.
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people make, choices which may be implicit in their practices. But suppose their
practices include active membership in communities which reject the premises of
Liberalism and also include propagation of the traditionalist community's il-Liberal
protocols through indoctrination of their children? Should those choices be tolerated
by Liberals? Perhaps the answer to that question depends on whether one advocates
Liberalism as a formula for the peaceful coexistence of people with different systems
of belief. Liberalism does have that instrumental value. But Liberalism itself is a
belief system, at least a conviction about the character of a good society and the
nature of an admirable life. Therefore, Liberalism, like Fundamentalism, can be
messianic particularly when it coincides with the conviction that the propagation of
Liberal values will serve the interests of the United States.
Even more than Liberalism, Fundamentalism can be widely referential, its
meaning varying with context. But I use it as a reference to cultures which idealize
the organization of family life along patriarchal lines with women in a subordinate
position insofar as legal rights, sexual freedom, family decisional power, and
relations with the larger society are concerned. Arguably, typifying this mindset was
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's criticism of a proposed United Nations
Commission on the Status of Women declaration condemning violence against
women," which included a statement of women's rights to choose their marriage
partners, to work, to travel, and to use contraception without their husband's
permission, and to take their husbands to court for marital rape." In a memorandum
commenting on the document, the Brotherhood stated: "This declaration, if ratified,
would lead to the complete disintegration of society"." In response, a spokesperson
for Egypt's National Council for Women condemned the Brotherhood's
condemnation.'
The Traditionalist culture also incorporates the premise that identity is inherited
and fixed rather than individually constructed, that virtue consists in adherence to
inherited traditions, that internal challenges to received beliefs is heresy,
abandonment of the faith is punishable apostasy akin to treason in secular societies,
and external criticism or satire of its central figures or core beliefs is blasphemy and
37. See Muslim Brotherhood Statement Denouncing UN Women Declaration for Violating sharia
Principles, IKHWANWEB (Mar. 14, 2013), http:www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=30731; see also
The National Council for Women's Response to the Muslim Brotherhood's Statement on the Proposed
Agreed Conclusions by the 57' Session of the Commission on the Status of Women on Violence Against





38. AIRES/48/104, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (Dec. 20, 1993),
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48rl04.htm.
39. Id.
40. Michelle Nichols, Egypt's Islamists warn giving women some rights could destroy society,
REUTERS (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-women-un-rights-
idUSBRE92EO3D20130315; see also The National Council for Women, supra note 37.
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should be punishable.4 1
Liberal minorities present public policy challenges to a secular Liberal state in
a host of areas: free speech, sexual and reproductive freedom, educational standards
including educational content and length, the regulation of marriage, gender equality
with respect to divorce and control of family property, and the treatment of children,
including protection of children from arranged marriages.4 2
III. MIGRATION AND THE RIGHT TO CULTURAL PRESERVATION
I want you to consider three questions: The first is whether international human
rights law prevents Western Governments from denying entry to migrants who
profess fundamentalist values. The second is whether human rights law requires
Western Governments to respect the practices of fundamentalist minorities already
settled in their countries. The third is whether, even if traditionalist minorities are
not legally protected, people who think they are supporters of human rights should
at least tolerate the efforts of fundamentalists to live and perpetuate culturally
distinctive lives.
The first question, that is whether governments can impose cultural tests on
persons wishing to enter and settle, assumes that governments have a broad
discretion to exclude those wishing to enter, indeed could if they wished (and if they
withdrew from the Refugee Convention), ban migration altogether. The legal case
for governmental power in this regard is powerful. The UN Charter is first and
foremost a defender of existing states from any threat to their "territorial integrity
and political independence."43 As opponents of any right to migration have argued,
what meaning can the political independence and territorial integrity of states have
if people can wander across their borders at will and settle on their territory?" A
heavily populated but militarily weak state could engulf its well-armed neighbor
simply by lifting border controls.
The omission in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of a
right to enter45 corresponding to the specifically enumerated right to leave46 can
therefore be seen as a corollary of the UN Charter's guarantee of state sovereignty.47
State practice reinforces the argument grounded in authoritative texts.
The moral as distinguished from the legal case for a right to exclude is much
41. Kareem Elbayar, Reclaiming Tradition: Islamic Law in a Modern World, GEORGE
WASHINGTON UNIV., http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/23.
42. Ben Hubbard, A Saudi Morals Enforcer Called for a More Liberal Islam. Then the Death
Threats Began., N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/1 l/world/niddleeast/saudi-arabia-islam-wahhabism-religious-
police.html.
43. U.N. Charter, art. 2, 1 4.
44. Catherine Dauvergne, Challenges to sovereignty: migration laws for the 21 "century, (UNHCR
Working Paper No. 92, 2003), http://www.unher.org/3f2f69e74.pdf.
45. ICCPR, supra note 36.
46. Id
47. See generally U.N. Charter.
VOL. 45:3294
2017 MIGRATION, CONFLICT & TERRORISM: DILEMMAS OF THE WEST
less clear.4 8 A moral right to enter could be seen as an emanation from the totality
of Liberal values reflected in the various human rights treaties. Consider the
Freedom of Association and Assembly.49 What could be more basic than my right
to share my home permanently with a person I met on my travels abroad or on the
Internet? In the globally connected world of 2016, and with the already enormous
migration of people from the lands of their birth, many citizens of every state are
likely to have human connections, both intimate and professional, that cross national
boundaries. So to say that the state has a largely unconstrained right to close its
borders is to concede to the state the authority sharply to diminish my associational
rights and, incidentally, to create great disparities among citizens in the enjoyment
of that right: those citizens whose intimate connections are entirely local will enjoy
the right fully while those whose connections are transnational will be vulnerable to
whatever limits the state chooses to impose.
A moral right to enter need not rest only on emanations from specific rights. It
may rest, perhaps even more securely, on the principles or deep normative premises
seen to lie behind the various legal enumerations. Arguably, one such moral premise
is that the state should not use violence against individuals whose actions do not
threaten the rights of others. Many aspiring migrants to Europe have repeatedliL
demonstrated that only physical violence will stop them. Africans, for instance, have
climbed high barbed wire fences and faced hails of rubber bullets trying to enter the
Spanish enclave of Ceuta in North Africa.5 0
A second principle or normative premise which could support a right to enter
is that no one should be denied the opportunity to lead a life with some opportunity
for improvement and some measure of choice. When a person struggling from day-
to-day in some Southern country's informal economy, a person like Mohamed
Bouzazi, the Tunisian street vendor whose self-immolation ignited the Arab Spring,
moves from his or her country of birth into a comparatively well-governed, capital-
rich country in Europe or North America, he or she enters a new universe of
opportunity and quotidian security. Where grotesque inequality in life chances
stemming from the accident of birth in a poor country can be radically mitigated by
no more than acquiescence in entry, can persons who believe in the moral equality
of all people bar the gates? Barring entry of non-threatening migrants is an
affirmative action denying people the chance to escape the prison of poverty and
powerlessness where the accident of birth deposited them. It is a means of enforcing
what Josef Carens calls a geographical caste system, "the modem equivalent o
feudal privilege which was an inherited status that greatly enhanced one's life
48. WELLMAN, supra note 2.
49. The Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association and the Internet, ASS'N FOR
PROGRESSIVE COMMUNICATIONS, https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/Gl0/166/98/PDF/GlI016698.pdfOpenElement; see generally Special
Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, UNHCR,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/AssemblyAssociation/Pages/SRFreedomAssemblyAssociationlndex.as
px (last visited Mar. 1, 2017).
50. Spain: 400 migrants storm North African border fence, FoX NEWS (Dec. 9, 2016),
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/12/09/spain-400-migrants-storm-north-african-border-fence.html.
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chances.""
Despite its considerable power, the moral argument for open borders is not
decisive. There is a possible response also grounded in the Liberal values which
inform the human rights texts, in particular the linked rights of self-determination,
self-government, and, paradoxically, the Freedom of Association and Assembly.52
In long-established states like those of North America and Western Europe, which
have evolved organically and where a certain unifying national spirit prevails,
people imagine themselves as forming an enduring political association with
boundaries within which members share a history, a sense of comradeship, and sets
of quotidian practices and understandings. From that association they derive an
identity. Not their only identity but one of such power that, when necessary, they
risk their lives for it.
Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights declares
the right of citizens "to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through
freely chosen representatives."3 Taking part in public affairs through freely chosen
representatives would be gaseous rhetoric if it were not construed to mean that
majorities can decide issues of great moment.5 4 Who can enter the country and on
what conditions has long been such an issue.
That is one string to this argument's bow. Its second string is the plausible claim
that the coherent management of public affairs is impossible without a fairly stable
body politic. Issues need to be defined, proposals for their resolution tested, potential
representatives identified and assessed. How can this be accomplished if millions of
people unfamiliar with the society's problems and personalities, its resources and
institutions and historical experiences, persons who may not even be able to read or
speak its principal language, can pour into the body politic in an unending stream?
The political philosopher Michael Walzer has put the point in a slightly
different way. The political order, he has argued, is the outcome of negotiation and
struggle over time and in a determinate place, a struggle towards what he calls a
"common standpoint of morality," a moral settlement.55 Where the moral settlement
not only sustains civic peace but is as well the source of individual freedom and the
relatively equal application of the law, it can be defended in the name of Liberalism.
So, if migration of a certain size or composition is reasonably calculated to
undermine the settlement, then on this view the Liberal democratic society is entitled
to restrain or condition it. Whether migration does or could have that effect is, of
course, a judgment about which people continue to disagree furiously.
The triumph of Liberal values in each Western country is not decisive.5 6 So,
51. Compare CHANDRAN KUKATHAS, THE LIBERAL ARCHIPELAGO: A THEORY OF DIVERSITY AND
FREEDOM 153-54 (2003), with JOSPEH H. CARENS, IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP 131-35 (2002).
52. Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, supra
note 49.
53. ICCPR, supra note 36, art. 25(a).
54. Id.
55. Michael Walzer, Response to Kukathas, in IAN SHAPIRO AND WILL KYMLICKA, EDS.,
ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS (1997).
56. See generally James Taub, FOREIGN POLICY, https://foreignpolicy.com/author/james-traub/.
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one could argue, defenders of those values have reason to resist an unqualified right
to cross borders. If there is a largely unqualified right to enter, persons coming from
societies where Liberal values have not prevailed might bring with them the
dominant values of those societies and thus serve as reinforcements for Liberalism's
enemies.
But do international human rights norms allow for discrimination among
prospective migrants on the basis of a person's cultural values? Certainly, a case can
be made that they bar discrimination on the basis of religion. But would a test
intending to bar entry for persons who believe that women must be governed by men
or express homophobic views constitute discrimination on the basis of religion? A
government like that of the Netherlands which has introduced something like a
cultural test5 7 would argue that such views are not integral to any of the great faiths
but can be found among certain believers in all of them. For instance, a virulent
strain of homophobia exists in Christian majority countries like Uganda where
radical American evangelists have encouraged the passage of vicious anti-gay
laws.5 1 In any event, people are denied entry not because of their religious identity
but rather because certain of their practices or convictions threaten the rights of
others.
But, even if we assume that states have a moral as well as legal right to limit
entry, there remains the question of the legal and moral rights of traditionalist
minorities who have already entered and settled. What legal protection do
international human rights norms offer to minority communities in general and to il-
Liberal minorities in particular? Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (Covenant) requires tates "to have respect for the liberty of
parents.. to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity
with their own convictions."" However, it makes that liberty subject to "such
limitations... as are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others."' That limitation can cover a lot of
ground. It could, for instance, be construed to give governments discretion to require
private schools established by Islamic fundamentalists to teach: (1) the necessity of
respect for members of other faiths and for agnostics and atheists, (2) the equality of
men and women and their equal right to shape their individual lives and the life of
their family, (3) the value of free speech including speech critical of religious beliefs,
and (4) the right of every person to change his or her religious identity: In short, to
teach things at odds with traditionalist culture.
Article 23 of the Covenant declares the family to be "the natural and
fundamental group unit of society and entitled to protection by society and the
state."' An emphasis on the family unit rather than the individual is promising from
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the fundamentalist perspective. However, it turns out that the family being protected
is not necessarily the fundamentalist's idea of a proper family model, for Article 23
also provides that "States Parties... shall take appropriate steps to ensure quality of
rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its
dissolution." In addition, it declares that "No marriage shall be entered into without
the free and full consent of the intending spouses."6 2 So much for arranged
marriages-particularly of the very young.
Fundamentalists might also invoke Article 26 which obligates State Parties to
"prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective
protection against discrimination on the basis of 'political or other opinion."'"6 They
could contend that their views on the rights of women or on intimate same-sex
relations are protected "opinions." The government, conversely, could invoke
Article 26 since it requires governments to prevent discrimination on the basis of
sex.' Only Article 27 addresses the minorities question directly,65 but it can most
reasonably be construed to reinforce the previous articles and to guarantee equal
opportunity and treatment for ethnic and religious minorities in competition for jobs
and access to education and other societal goods.
Putting aside the question of legal protection, what is the moral argument for
toleration of traditionalist practices by secular Liberal governments? On both
principled and prudential grounds strong multiculturalists like Chandran Kukathas
urge us to reject the "what-should-be-tolerated" framing of the policy issue.6 6
Kukathas urges Liberals to think instead of cultures as coming together in a position
of equality of right to reproduce themselves. He concedes that probably would lead
to an archipelago of cultural identities and social practices within the Liberal nation-
state.6 1
Multiculturalists differ in the lengths to which they would push the idea of
communal cultural autonomy. Kukathas would deny the Liberal state the right to
override community practices and beliefs which offend Liberal sensibilities such as
the patriarchal organization of the family, isolation of women, arranged marriages,
and gendered differences in education. What he does insist on, however, is a state-
protected right of exit from the community."
The Canadian multiculturalist Will Kymlicka's formula is cultural autonomy
for migrant communities up to the point where their practices violate basic human
rights.69 It leaves us with a serious line-drawing problem. Which human rights are
basic? Can the government in the name of equal protection punish Sunni
fundamentalist owners of restaurants who refuse to admit Shia Muslims, Christians,
62. Id. art. 23(3).
63. Id. art. 26.
64. Id.
65. Id. art. 27.
66. KUKATHAS, supra note 2.
67. Id.
68. Id
69. WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS
1-9 (1996).
VOt. 45:3298
2017 MIGRATION, CONFLICT & TERRORISM: DILEMMAS OF THE WEST
Jews, and others who do not share their beliefs? Can it enforce rape law against a
fundamentalist who did not have the consent of his wife for sexual intercourse? Can
it insist in the name of protecting fundamental rights that all children attend public
pre-schools where they will be taught Liberal values embedded in the constitution?
Michael Walzer, whom I mentioned earlier, enters the debate from a slightly
different angle. What every successful society needs, he argues, is a "common
standpoint of morality" but one defined in primarily political not cultural terms.70
The common standpoint is a consensus about a just organization of society which
means it defines the terms in which groups compete for social and economic
goods-income, wealth, access to education, celebrity-and identifies the things
they should share equally like impartial application of the law, equal access to public
services, equal opportunity to work in the state bureaucracy, and protection from
destitution. The consensus, in his words, "represents the gradual shaping of a
common life-at least, a common political life."7 1 "Religious differences and
cultural pluralism," he adds, "are entirely compatible with this kind of common
moral standpoint."72
IV. CULTURAL DIFFERENCE AND SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACY
And so we arrive at the last question I want to put to you and to me as well,
because I am not sure of the answer. Is a common moral standpoint necessary for a
long-enduring democratic society?
Consider the United States. Can its electorate be said to enjoy a "common moral
standpoint"? Where is the point of commonality between those who believe that
abortion is largely a matter of choice and those who label it murder; that physically
intimate same-sex relationships are sinful and those who believe that sexual
relationships between consenting adults are entirely a matter of choice; that the state
should protect all members of the society from destitution and those who believe
that in most cases destitution is the result of personal failings and therefore its
consequences should not be mitigated; between those who believe that all persons
are created equal and those who believe in a racially-defined hierarchy of talent and
character; between those who believe that atheists and agnostics are unfit for public
office and those who believe that faith is irrelevant for assessing candidates?
Could it nevertheless be argued despite those polar differences in value there
exists a "common moral standpoint" among the settled inhabitants of the United
States? My reply is "maybe". It depends what we mean by a common moral
standpoint. It could mean only a consensus about the justness of a society's
constitutional arrangements, about, that is, the procedure by which it produces public
policies rather than the policies themselves. And arguably there is commonality in
this sense.
In order to achieve this common standpoint of morality, however, we had to
fight a ferocious Civil War and as evidence recently presented to the United States
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Supreme Court in connection with litigation over the Voting Rights Act implies,7 3
the attribution of fundamental rights much less support for equal life chances for all
citizens is not universal. Opinion polling supports my intuition that a considerable
majority of the American people believes or at least thinks it believes that all
citizens, whatever their color, ethnic background, or creed should have equal
opportunities to improve the conditions of their lives and that all of us are entitled to
the equal protection of the laws, to a fair trial, to privacy in our homes, to an
extensive freedom of speech and conscience and expression of religious faith and a
right to participate in the political process. Those shared beliefs could be said to
constitute a common moral standpoint.
One thing that worries me these days is evidence of stress on that common
standpoint. I am concerned particularly with the 25 percent of the population who
continue to question the legitimacy of the Obama Presidency ostensibly on the
grounds that he was probably born abroad.74 Also concerning is recent polling data
indicating that people who identify with either of the two major political parties are
beginning not simply to disagree but literally to hate each other for the sheer fact of
belonging to the other party as if their party affiliation were a proxy for moral
degradation. 7 Additional grounds for concern are efforts to limit the right to vote.
Fortunately, there remains a majority of Americans committed to the idea of a
common citizenship, a patriotic bond, which transcends differences about how to
implement our common values. 7  And even more fortunately, tolerance of
difference, all kinds of difference, is far greater among younger people.77 And that
gives us grounds for optimism, even after this terrible electoral season, that the Bill
of Rights culture will endure.
What is the prospect for Liberal values in West European societies where on
the whole economies are grinding more slowly and the pressure of migration from
culturally more distinct countries is more intense? One source of hope is their
economic need for large-scale migration in order to support the aging indigenous
population. For instance, to maintain the current ratio of employed persons to
retirees, Germany needs an annual intake of four-hundred-thousand working age
people.78 But the rise of right-wing parties and the signs of a kind of cultural panic
like the local level banning from public beaches in France of women in body-
covering garments7 9 demonstrates to me that the economic argument is politically
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weak.
In Europe, the state must summon the human and material resources to connect
new arrivals with long-established residentsso and with the supportive institutions of
the state, not simply its repressive ones. I do not see how this can be done without
the introduction of compulsory national service where young people in small units
integrated by class and ethnicity and led by carefully-trained adults serve the
common good while living together and establishing thereby networks which could
last a lifetime. In addition, the state must establish catchment areas in North and
West Africa where prospective migrants can be taught a European language and
labor force skills. To finance such an effort, Europe will, among other things, need
to redeploy much of the 70 billion a year in foreign assistance it currently sends to
countries in the Global South other than the funds, now inadequate, needed to assist
the millions of displaced persons in the Middle East and West Asia. European states
must also, I believe, require and integrate pre-school socialization. At the same time
it must avoid measures which evidence contempt for traditionalist communities like
the laws banning signs of piety such as headscarves and it must demonstrate positive
respect by helping to finance the construction of prayer spaces and community
centers and revising textbooks to reflect and celebrate the historical and
contemporaneous presence and contributions of migrant communities.
Can the European state undertake the respectful integration of Muslim
immigrants in the face of the continuing threat of mass-casualty terrorism? One
searches with difficulty to find grounds for optimism. As Lawrence Wright, one of
our most empathetic and incisive writers about jihadi terrorism, concludes in his
recent book The Terror Years, it is "common to suggest," he says,
that dealing with the root causes of terrorism is the best and maybe the
only way to bring it to an end, but there is very little evidence to support
that notion. Poverty doesn't necessarily lead to acts of terror. Nor does
tyranny, nor do wars, corruption, a lack of education or opportunity. [...]
Not one of these factors by itself is sufficient to say that here at last is the
reason that idealistic young people line up for the opportunity to behead
their opponents or blow themselves up in a fruit market. But each of those
factors is a tributary in a mighty river that floods the Middle East, a river
that we can call Despair.8'
I ask myself: can we in the West find the will, the understanding, and the
capacity to help dam that river? All I get in the form of an answer is a large question
mark. This is, no doubt, how Winston Churchill felt about Britain's prospects early
in World War H. All we can do is what he did, namely to struggle forward toward
an uncertain end.
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